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The 2011 book Queer (In)Justice surveys involvement of sexual
minorities in all phases of the what the authors term the “criminal legal
system.” It examines the treatment of LGBTQ people as criminal
defendants, victims, and prisoners. Queer (In)Justice moves beyond the
typical focus of gay rights activists and scholars in the criminal law area to
address the everyday treatment of LGBTQ people by police, prosecutors,
courts, and corrections authorities. Relying heavily on prison abolitionist
movement thinking, the book calls into question reliance on criminal
punishment as a means of combating violence against LGBTQ people.
Although largely anecdotal, and sometimes over-heated in its rhetoric,
Queer (In)Justice succeeds in constructing a compelling narrative and
mapping out largely uncharted territory. This Review provides an overview
and critique of Queer (In)Justice, situating the book within current legal
scholarship. The Review then suggests topics for further research in this
developing area, taking account of recent developments in the LGBTQ
rights movement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1

Recently, the LGBTQ rights movement has had high-profile victories,
such as the passage of same-sex marriage legislation in New York and the
repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. There is some truth to the observation that
these well-financed2 campaigns reflect the priorities of economically
advantaged, predominantly white gays to gain mainstream status and
acceptance.3 This is not the whole story, however. When New Yorkers
celebrated marriage equality, they did so at the Stonewall Inn,4 recognized
as a birthplace of the gay rights movement and the site of the 1969 uprising
against police harassment by relatively powerless and stigmatized gay and
transgender people, some of them young people of color.5
1
We use the term “LGBTQ” to include the categories lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, queer, and questioning. The term “queer” broadly defines those who do not fit
within majority groups of sexual orientation, sexual expression, and gender identity. We
occasionally use the terms “LGBTQ” and “queer” interchangeably.
2
See Michael Barbaro, Behind Gay Marriage, an Unlikely Mix of Forces, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2011, at A1 (describing the Wall Street financing of extremely well-organized
lobbying efforts in support of the same-sex marriage bill); see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Out
and Proud to Serve, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A12 (describing the repeal of Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell on September 20, 2011, and the new policy that allows gay and lesbian service
members to serve openly).
3
JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE, at xviii (2011) (“[LGBTQ rights groups]
have been dominated by white, middle-class leadership and membership, and have also
relied heavily on financial support of affluent, white gays. As a result, their agendas tend to
favor assimilation . . . over challenges to the systemic violence and oppressions it
produces.”); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW 5 (1999) (“[G]aylegal struggles
have been dominated by white middle-class male perspectives.”); Courtney Megan Cahill,
Disgust and the Problematic Politics of Similarity, 109 MICH. L. REV. 943, 956 (2011)
(“[T]he more that gays look like straights, the more likely it is that those straights who are
unsympathetic to the idea of same-sex marriage might be able to empathize . . . .”); Nancy
Polikoff, Equality and Justice for Lesbian and Gay Families and Relationships, 61 RUTGERS
L. REV. 529, 544 (2009) (“The couples chosen as plaintiffs in marriage litigation, and others
who are spokespersons for marriage equality, emphasize how much they resemble married
heterosexual couples.”); Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361,
1375, 1389 (2005) (identifying Massachusetts marriage equality opinion’s “like-straight”
reasoning and its “assimilation of homosexuality to a heterosexualized marriage norm”).
4
Elizabeth A. Harris & Adriane Quinlan, Where the Fight Began, Cries of Joy and Talk
of Weddings, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at A3 (“Crowds gathered, screamed and embraced
in Sheridan Square near the Stonewall Inn, where the gay-rights movement began more than
40 years ago.”).
5
See Shannon Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? Getting Real About
Transgender Inclusion in the Gay Rights Movement, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 589, 592
(2001) (asserting that transgender people were “the most likely to fight back at Stonewall,”
and describing the gay rights movement as “a movement that was launched by bull daggers,
drag queens, and transsexuals in 1969”); see also Morgan Bassichis, Alexander Lee & Dean
Spade, Building an Abolitionist Trans & Queer Movement with Everything We’ve Got, in
CAPTIVE GENDERS 15 (Eric A. Stanley & Nat Smith eds., 2011) (describing the Stonewall
Rebellion as “a fight against racist, anti-poor, and anti-queer violence”).
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Many of the recent LGBTQ movement’s goals turn on weighty
constitutional law questions, perhaps partly because of what Justice Scalia
has termed the “law-profession culture”6 in which the issues are debated
and litigated. At times, however, these debates do not capture the full
complexity of the challenges facing LGBTQ people, some of whom are
more concerned with meeting basic economic needs than with gaining the
ability to marry. And many LGBTQ people of color, as members of
multiple minority groups, grapple with the “synergistic” forms of such
multi-level discrimination.7
In the criminal justice arena, the LGBTQ rights movement has had
particularly narrow goals. The movement has principally focused its energy
on undoing unfavorable legislation—sodomy laws—and on enacting
legislation viewed as favorable—hate crimes, sentencing enhancement
statutes, and, more recently, anti-bullying statutes. Many thus viewed the
Supreme Court’s 2003 invalidation of sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas8
as an overarching gay rights victory9 and states’ enactment of hate crimes
statutes as evidence of society’s move towards protecting sexual minorities
as it protects racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.
These achievements have had limited effects on the day-to-day
6

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion
is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely
signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by
some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has
traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.”). Justice Scalia used the term “lawprofession culture” disparagingly, in order to group the Lawrence majority with “lawprofession” elites. We employ his term to make a different point—that LGBTQ rights
advocates often focus their efforts on constitutional rights litigation, reflecting the underlying
interests of those advocates, many of whom hail from academia.
7
Darren Leonard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity,
and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1384 (2000) (arguing that “gay
rights activists pursue white and upper-class political agendas”); see also Kristine E.
Newhall & Erin E. Buzuvis, (e)Racing Jennifer Harris: Sexuality and Race, Law and
Discourse in Harris v. Portland, 32 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 345 (2008) (using “intersectional
analysis” to describe how both homophobia and racism played a role in discrimination
against a Penn State basketball player).
8
539 U.S. at 578. Although sodomy prosecutions for private, non-commercial
consensual sexual activities were relatively rare, sodomy laws did have a wide impact on
LGBTQ rights in other areas, such as family law. See infra text accompanying notes 13–14.
9
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review
to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1040 (2004) (“Lawrence
represent[s] a regime shift for gay people analogous to the regime shift that Brown and
Loving represented for people of color and that Roe and Craig represented for women.”);
Sarah Kershaw, Adversaries on Gay Rights Vow State-by-State Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2003, at N8 (“[Lawrence was] a revolutionary moment akin to the aftermath of the decisions
in Brown v. the Board of Education, which banned school segregation, and Roe v. Wade,
which legalized abortion.”).
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functioning of the criminal justice system, however. Lawrence was surely a
watershed victory,10 and its elimination of criminal stigma has real practical
importance for LGBTQ people in areas such as family law.11 However, the
decision has had relatively limited effect as criminal law precedent.12
Similarly, hate crimes statutes may send an important message, but have
done little to deter violence against LGBTQ people.13 Indeed, the most
recent data show a substantial increase in hate crimes against LGBTQ
people, including horrific examples of hate-inspired homicides.14
It is perhaps time, then, for the LGBTQ rights movement to expand its
principal criminal justice goals to the issues that continue to confront
LGBTQ people on the street and in the home every day. In terms of crime
enforcement, LGBTQ people face discrimination by police and prosecutors
on an ongoing basis. And as victims of crime, LGBTQ people face police
indifference, even hostility, when confronted with crimes such as domestic
abuse.
Refocusing the LGBTQ-rights movement in the criminal justice
context would therefore mean moving beyond broad constitutional and
legislative goals towards ground-level issues such as discriminatory prison
policy and practice, police targeting of LGBTQ people, police indifference

10
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 10 (“Enforced or not, sodomy laws have accumulated a
cultural force that extends beyond their now technically defunct legal reach.”); see id. at 72–
73 (discussing the collateral consequences of sodomy statutes).
11
See Matt Larsen, Note, Lawrence v. Texas and Family Law: Gay Parents’
Constitutional Rights in Child Custody Proceedings, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 53
(2004) (arguing that after Lawrence, it is unconstitutional to consider gay parents’ sexual
orientations in custody disputes).
12
M. Blake Huffman, North Carolina Courts: Legislating Compulsory Heterosexuality
by Creating New Crimes Under the Crime Against Nature Statute Post-Lawrence v. Texas,
20 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (2011) (describing how North Carolina courts have continued to
enforce the “crime against nature” statute post-Lawrence by judicially narrowing it, while
countenancing discriminatory enforcement against LGBT defendants); J. Kelly Strader,
Resurrecting Lawrence v. Texas as a Basis for Challenging Criminal Prosecutions, 25
CRIM. JUST. 30, 31 (Summer 2010) (surveying post-Lawrence precedent and concluding that
“the Lawrence decision has had surprisingly little impact on lower federal courts and state
courts” in criminal cases).
13
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 126 (noting statistics documenting a jump in anti-gay
bias crimes in California during the Proposition 8 campaign).
14
See Lee Romney, Hate Crimes Against Gays, Others Rise, Report Says, L.A. TIMES,
July 13, 2011, at A12 (reporting that data collected by the National Coalition of AntiViolence Programs show a 13% increase from 2009 to 2010 in violent crimes against
LGBTQ people or those perceived to fall within that group). The data reveal some chilling
recent examples: “An 18-year-old gay man from Texas allegedly slain by a classmate who
feared a sexual advance. A 31-year-old transgender woman from Pennsylvania found dead
with a pillowcase around her head. A 24-year-old lesbian from Florida purportedly killed by
her girlfriend’s father, who disapproved of the relationship.” Id.
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to violence against LGBTQ people, and the discriminatory treatment of
LGBTQ people in the courts. In some respects, this shift would mark a
return to the core issues that touched off the modern gay rights movement.
As scholars of criminal law who examine issues of gender and
sexuality, we were therefore heartened to see the release of a book devoted
to LGBTQ issues in criminal justice.
Queer (In)Justice: The
Criminalization of LGBT People in the United States, by Joey Mogul,
Andrea Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock, synthesizes many themes emerging
from research and activism regarding queer folk in various aspects of the
criminal justice system—including violence against LGBTQ people, use of
homophobic tropes in prosecutions of LGBTQ people, and custodial sexual
abuse of prisoners with non-heterosexual orientations.15
The book is a welcome contribution, given that many leading works
about “gays and the law” discuss criminal issues primarily within the
context of sodomy laws and other criminal prohibitions used to stigmatize
sexual minorities.16 Because the book’s narrative is often based in
anecdote, Queer (In)Justice does not always provide a comprehensive
overview of the issues it addresses. Nonetheless, the book effectively
widens the lens to encompass more aspects of LGBTQ interaction with the
criminal justice system than are typically the focus of criminal justice
reform efforts. The book follows themes of subordination of LGBTQ
people through various phases of the process (arrest, charging, trial,
incarceration) and across roles within that process (defendant, victim,
prisoner).
Most interesting to us, and potentially to other scholars, the book
suggests many areas for further study. In this Review, we identify openings
for scholarship that would build upon the themes and issues that Queer
(In)Justice raises. The potential topics are numerous and include traditional
legal scholarship, cross-disciplinary scholarship, and qualitative and
quantitative research.
In Part II, this Review provides an overview of Queer (In)Justice. Part
III focuses on some particular narratives that the authors discuss and that
illustrate the daily injustices faced by LGBTQ people. Part IV discusses the
shortcomings of recent criminal justice reform efforts, and Part V
introduces topics for further research and reform.
II. BROADENING THE DEBATE
Queer (In)Justice seeks to substantially broaden the focus of the
15

MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3.
See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 327–83 (describing and compiling laws and
regulations targeting gay people throughout American history).
16
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criminal justice reform movement on behalf of LGBTQ people. The book
situates the problem of violence against gays within the framework of
“mass incarceration.”17 It draws on the work of critics of the “prisonindustrial complex,” including Angela Y. Davis18 and progressive activist
groups such as Critical Resistance and the Sylvia Rivera Law Project.19 At
times, the rhetoric of the prison abolition movement can be a bit overheated, and Queer (In)Justice shares this flaw. The book does effectively
elucidate, however, the ways in which the “criminal legal system”—as the
authors term it20 and as others have noted—is “regressive.”21 That is, the
system ensnares poor people of color, with a special burden on poor people
of color who are gay or transgender.
The work is organized in part chronologically and in part thematically.
It begins with a chapter on “Colonial Legacies,” tracing the origins and
enforcement of colonial sodomy laws.22 The second chapter, “Gleeful Gay
Killers, Lethal Lesbians, and Deceptive Gender Benders,” focuses on
“queer criminal archetypes,” from demonized killers Leopold & Loeb to
executed Florida prostitute-turned-alleged-serial-killer Aileen Wuornos.23
The third chapter, “The Ghosts of Stonewall,” describes the policing of gay
social spaces, sex work, and public sex.24 In the fourth chapter, “Objection!
Treatment of Queers in Criminal Courts,” the authors describe homophobia
and transphobia in the judicial system.25 The fifth chapter, “Caging
Deviance: Prisons as Queer Spaces,” is one of the most detailed and

17

MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at xii; see Loic Wacquant, Class, Race &
Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 74 (crediting
David Garland with introducing the term “mass incarceration” into the popular and scholarly
discourse).
18
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at xvi.
19
Id. at 146–49. See DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL
TRANS POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 19–42 (2011) (describing the political philosophy
of the critical, prison-abolitionist trans movement).
20
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at xix–xx.
21
Cf. David Rudovksky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to Reform Racially Biased
Criminal Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 98–99 (2007) (arguing that
“the ‘politics of crime,’ which encourages elected officials to expand the reach and the
sanctions of criminal law, leads to regressive and racially biased practices across the
system”). The Queer (In)Justice authors sometimes employ especially fiery rhetoric to make
their point. See, e.g., MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at xx (describing the “historically
pervasive, consistent, and persistent systemic violence that characterizes the criminal legal
system” and concluding that the system is “rotten—that is to say, foundationally and
systematically violent and unjust”).
22
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 1–19.
23
Id. at 20–44.
24
Id. at 45–68.
25
Id. at 69–91.
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substantive chapters in the book.26 In this chapter, the authors describe the
myriad ways in which LGBTQ prisoners suffer discrimination and abuse.
The sixth chapter, “False Promises: Criminal Legal Responses to Violence
Against LGBT People,” examines the ways in which criminal justice
reform has failed to alleviate the wrongs described in the earlier chapters.27
In the final chapter, “Over the Rainbow: Where Do We Go from Here?,”
the authors suggest approaches for correcting these wrongs, with particular
attention paid to economically disadvantaged persons, trans persons, and
people of color.28
Queer (In)Justice attempts an ambitious survey. The work’s scope is
itself useful, given that scholars have yet to examine many aspects of how
the criminal legal system treats LGBT people. However, the book’s
effectiveness is at times undercut by its largely anecdotal approach, which
strings together a series of high-profile incidents and cases. The book often
reads like a collection of stories that made the news, many of them (such as
the Leopold and Loeb case) well-known and often told. The book also
largely fails to provide comprehensive data or evidence of discrimination.
This emphasis on storytelling over quantitative research may be
understandable, given that the three co-authors are primarily civil rights
advocates. Despite these shortcomings, there is an undeniable power in the
narrative that the book tells. The next section provides a brief overview of
that narrative.
III. THE POWER OF THE NARRATIVE
The collective power of the stories that the authors present cannot be
denied. Queer (In)Justice puts a human face on the issues by recounting
numerous disturbing, and sometimes horrific, instances of abuse and
discrimination. The authors chronicle the discriminatory treatment of
LGBTQ people, citing studies done by bar associations and judicial
commissions: queer defendants are more likely to be arrested and
prosecuted for certain offenses than straight defendants; queer youth are
more likely to be detained pretrial than straight youth; and queer defendants
convicted of sex offenses receive harsher sentences than their straight
counterparts.29
26

Id. at 92–117.
Id. at 118–40.
28
Id. at 141–58.
29
Id. at 77–78; see also Caitlyn Silhan, The Present Case Does Involve Minors: An
Overview of the Discriminatory Effects of Romeo and Juliet Provisions and Sentencing
Practices on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth, 20 LAW & SEXUALITY 97
(2011) (describing how “Romeo and Juliet” exceptions to statutory rape provisions often
apply only to opposite-sex couples, resulting in long prison sentences and sex offender
27
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The authors also recount numerous examples of homophobic rhetoric
used by courts and prosecutors. In one homicide case, for example, a
prosecutor described the defendant as a “hard-core” lesbian.30 In a death
penalty case in which the defendant was convicted of killing his lover, the
prosecutor argued for the death penalty on the grounds that “sending a
homosexual to the penitentiary certainly isn’t a very bad punishment.”31 In
a case in which a transgender man was prosecuted for sexual assault on the
theory that consensual sex acts were rendered involuntary because the
complainants did not know the defendant was trans, the judge said at
sentencing, “What this case is about is deceit.” The judge thus viewed the
defendant’s gender identity as a lie rather than as a genuine expression of
the defendant’s self.32
One of the best-developed chapters elaborates upon the theme of
“prisons as queer spaces.”33 It begins with a well-publicized account, the
Roderick Johnson case, one of the best-known examples of prison sexual
violence. While incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Johnson was subjected to numerous, brutal sexual assaults. When he
sought help, prison officials made repeated remarks suggesting that Johnson
should not mind the abuse because he was gay.34
While this chapter discusses how prison sexual violence
disproportionately affects LGBTQ prisoners, it does not offer much
sustained analysis of the efforts to eliminate prison sexual violence.35 It
cites the first Bureau of Justice Statistics national survey on the issue in
200336 and mentions the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA),37 but it does
not evaluate the PREA reforms or describe the countervailing restrictions
on prisoners’ access to courts under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA).38
registration for LGBTQ youth who participate in the same conduct as their straight
counterparts).
30
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 83.
31
Id. at 89.
32
Id. at 77; see also Aeyal Gross, Gender Outlaws Before the Law: The Courts of the
Borderland, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 165 (2009) (discussing a similar case in Israel).
33
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 95; see Daniel R. Schaffer, Queer (In)Justice: The
Criminalization of LGBT People in the United States, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, July 2011, at 48
(reviewing MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3 in the leading publication directed at incarcerated
people).
34
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 93.
35
Id. at 98–103.
36
Id. at 99.
37
Id. at 105–06; see PREA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609 (2006).
38
See PLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3623; 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (2006)); Margo Schlanger & Giovanna
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Queer (In)Justice goes beyond the problem of prison rape, outlining
other issues affecting LGBTQ prisoners. It describes how correctional
facilities penalize consensual sex between inmates and punish prisoners
who are perceived to be gay or gender non-conforming for non-sexual
behavior.39
It mentions the “butch wing” in Fluvanna Women’s
Correctional Center in Virginia, in which gender-nonconforming women
were segregated and taunted.40 It also deals at length with the problems of
transgender prisoners, including a heightened risk of sexual assault and
limited access to gender-affirming medical care.41
The authors demonstrate the influence of prison abolition movement
thinking,42 arguing that prisons are “mythmaking institutions” that reinforce
gendered roles and stereotypes, as well as racial tropes.43 In a recent article,
law professor Kim Shayo Buchanan presented a particularly rich and
nuanced exposition of similar themes (though not necessarily tied to the
abolitionist movement). Professor Buchanan’s piece refutes racialized
myths about prison rape while seeking to expose how [non]responses to
prison sexual violence can reinforce conventional masculinities.44
Although Queer (In)Justice criticizes administrative segregation of gay
prisoners, it does not examine the controversy surrounding the K6G unit of
the Los Angeles County Detention Center.45 This segregated LGBTQ unit
has been the subject of varied assessments by legal scholars including
Russell K. Robinson and Sharon Dolovich.46 In provocative pieces,
Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails & Prisons: The Case for Amending the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139 (2008) (describing restrictions on
prison litigation under the PLRA).
39
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 97.
40
Id. at 109.
41
Id. at 110–17.
42
See Bassichis, Lee & Spade, supra note 5, at 16, 34 (questioning how the mainstream
gay rights movement became “pro-police, pro-prisons, and pro-war,” and advocating
“strategies that will reduce and ultimately eliminate the number of people and dollars going
into prison” (emphasis omitted)).
43
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 92–106; see Cassandra Shaylor, Neither Kind Nor
Gentle: The Perils of ‘Gender Responsive Justice,’ in THE VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION 145,
154 (Phil Scranton & Judge McMulloch eds., 2009) (advocating prison abolition as a
response to a correctional system that perpetuates racialized stereotypes of violent
masculinities).
44
Kim Shayo Buchanan, Our Prisons, Ourselves: Race, Gender & the Rule of Law,
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2010); see also Kim Shayo Buchanan, E-Race-ing Gender: The
Racial Construction of Prison Rape, in MULTIDIMENSIONAL MASCULINITIES AND LAW:
FEMINIST AND CRITICAL RACE APPROACHES (Frank R. Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds.,
forthcoming 2012).
45
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 108–09.
46
See Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Dolovich, Strategic Segregation]; Sharon Dolovich, Two Models
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Professors Robinson and Dolovich take different views of the K6G unit.
While Robinson criticizes it for relying on stereotypes about gay men and
for being culturally insensitive to the realities of men of color,47 Dolovich
defends the K6G unit as a necessary measure, given the violent atmosphere
of the L.A. County Jail.48
With respect to everyday criminal law enforcement, Queer (In)Justice
illustrates the ways in which police nationwide continue to target LGBTQ
people for certain crimes, especially “vice” crimes such as prostitution,
lewd conduct, and indecent exposure. The popular “broken windows”
theory of law enforcement assumes that such “quality of life” crimes can
lead to the deterioration of neighborhoods and to an increase in more
serious offenses. These types of crimes, however, provide police and
prosecutors with enormous discretion in deciding whether and when to
arrest and prosecute.49 The authors effectively describe how such vague
crimes as solicitation to commit prostitution can, for example, lead to
arrests for “walking while trans.”50 Such discriminatory practices seem to
fall under the radar of most groups focused on criminal justice reform and
LGBTQ rights.
As to the treatment of victims of crimes, the authors also effectively
describe the relative lack of attention paid to economically underprivileged
and trans victims, and to victims who are people of color. The authors, for
example, contrast the outraged response to Matthew Shepard’s murder with
the relative indifference that followed the killing in Memphis of an AfricanAmerican transgender woman, Duanna Johnson.51
Although the authors do not address the bullying issue in detail, we
note that the recent spate of bullying-induced suicides of young LGBTQ
people raises many of the same themes that the authors address. It is
significant, for example, that the most publicized of these cases have

of the Prison: Accidental Humanity and Hypermasculinity in the L.A. County Jail, 102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2012); Russell K. Robinson, Masculinity as Prison:
Sexual Identity, Race and Incarceration, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1309 (2011); see also Jeannie
Suk, Redistributing Rape, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111 (2011) (criticizing Dolovich’s defense
of the K6G unit as protecting only gay men and transgender women from prison rape).
47
Robinson, supra note 46, at 1335, 1376.
48
Dolovich, Strategic Segregation, supra note 46, at 5–6.
49
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 48–49, 53; see Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig,
Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006) (describing the “broken windows” theory and providing a critical
assessment of that theory).
50
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 61.
51
Id. at 143–45.
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involved victims who have been privileged and white.52
One of the book’s most important contributions is to describe the
violence inflicted by the system itself. The authors note that “statesponsored violence is seldom named and prosecuted as criminal, though it
may involve killing large numbers of people, torture, massive theft, and use
of sexual violence.”53 As the book recounts, recent statistics show that “law
enforcement officers were the third largest category of perpetrators of antiLGBT violence”54 and the “problem of police misconduct is both systemic
and commonplace.”55 Yet such violence has seldom been addressed by
mainstream LGBTQ rights organizations.56
Discriminatory police practices in arrests and prosecutions are
themselves a form of violence against LGBTQ people. Police targeting of
LGBTQ people is an ongoing miscarriage of justice, whether the offense is
“walking while trans” (prosecuted as soliciting prostitution) or soliciting
“lewd conduct” in places (such as remote parts of public parks) where the
harm from such conduct is hard to fathom.57 As the authors note, “[g]ay
men and transgender women are among the most visible targets of sex
policing.”58
Despite a popular perception that anti-gay policing is a bygone

52

Compare, for example, the amount of attention paid to the suicides of Tyler Clementi
and Carl Walker-Hoover. See Richard Pérez-Peña & Nate Schweber, Roommate Is
Arraigned in Rutgers Suicide Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at A22 (describing the
highly-publicized suicide of Rutgers University student Tyler Clementi that resulted from
the taping and public posting of Clementi’s sexual encounter with another man); Chris
Rohmann, Stage Struck: Pesticide for Bullies, VALLEY ADVOC. (May 20, 2010),
http://www.valleyadvocate.com/article.cfm?aid=11785 (describing the suicide of elevenyear-old African-American Springfield student Carl Walker-Hoover, who was bullied
because he was perceived to be gay, and whose tragic death “provoked far less media
attention and community soul-searching than” the highly-publicized suicide of Phoebe
Prince, who was taunted because of an opposite-sex love triangle).
53
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at xvi.
54
Id. at 47.
55
Id. at 51.
56
Id. at 47.
57
There is substantial scholarship concerning the legal, cultural, and expressive aspects
of public sex. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Privacy, Property, and Public Sex, 18 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 12–31 (2008); Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay
and Lesbian Free Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-)
Queers, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 509–10 (2004); Marc Spindelman, Surviving
Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1658–59 (2004); see generally MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY 167–203 (2010) (describing how the use of
disgust as a reaction to same-sex sexual activities leads to increased enforcement of statutes
that criminalize public sex).
58
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 53.
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problem of the pre-Stonewall era,59 discriminatory police conduct continues
to occur every day all over the country. For just one highly publicized
example, which the authors do not mention, take the recent sting operation
conducted in Palm Springs, California—described as “the gayest city in
America.”60 The Palm Springs police chief recently provoked outrage when
directing an operation targeting a neighborhood known for gay cruising.61
The police chief told the arresting officers, “What a bunch of filthy motherfuckers. You guys should get paid extra for this.”62 After the remarks
became public, the police chief resigned in 2011.
As the authors of Queer (In)Justice point out, such attitudes exist
throughout police departments in America, and LGBTQ people suffer as a
result.63 Enforcement of lewd conduct statutes is rarely focused on straight
people.64 And though the queer rights movement may be squeamish about
confronting discriminatory prosecutions of public sex, these are cases that
regularly ruin people’s lives. One need not be a fan of former United States
Senator Larry Craig to question the wisdom of sending police officers into
bathroom stalls to effectively entrap closeted people who seek anonymous
sexual partners in public spaces.65 One man arrested in North Carolina,
post-Lawrence, for private conduct with another adult stated that although
the prosecutor ultimately dropped the charges, the arrest itself constituted
punishment: “as long as [the crime against nature] remains on the books, it
is a crime punishable by an arrest, a stay in jail, media attention and a fine
of $450.”66
These tactics can have far-reaching repercussions. For example, the
effects of lewd conduct targeting can and do turn tragic, leading to suicides
59

Cf. David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the
Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 880, 932 (2008) (making
a fascinating argument that modern criminal procedure privacy protections were shaped by
1960s “anxieties” about “homosexuality and its policing,” such as “peepholes and
undercover decoys in public lavatories,” and concluding that “[g]ay men and lesbians can
still face police harassment, but far less than they used to face”).
60
Phil Willon, Chief Quits Over Gay Sex Sting, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at AA1.
61
Id.
62
Palm Springs Police Chief Apologizes for Calling Gays ‘Filthy Mother F---,’ LGBTQ
NATION (Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2010/12/palm-springs-police-chiefapologizes-for-calling-gays-filthy-mother-f/.
63
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 45–68.
64
Id. at 53.
65
Entrapment as a formal defense is hard to prove, but entrapment is effectively what
occurs in many of these cases. For a comprehensive analysis of the entrapment defense in
the context of gay sting operations, see Jordan Blair Woods, Don’t Tap, Don’t Stare, and
Keep Your Hands to Yourself! Critiquing the Legality of Gay Sting Operations, 12 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 545 (2009).
66
Huffman, supra note 12, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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when the names of the arrestees become public.67 Also, defendants arrested
for crimes such as lewd conduct may be too afraid of public exposure to
even present a defense to the charges.68 Conviction of even a minor sex
offense can mandate registration as a sex offender and produce dire
employment consequences.69 And, not surprisingly, given the over-policing
of racial and ethnic minorities,70 the people targeted for these crimes are
often people of color.71
Even LGBTQ juveniles may face a
disproportionate risk of criminal sanction for alleged sex offenses such as
statutory rape.72
In addition, LGBTQ people face discrimination within the courts
themselves.73 Studies have shown that queer people commonly face
derogatory comments in the courts and even discrimination by the attorneys
who represent them.74 One respondent to a California survey on LGBTQ
people in the courts stated that, “jury members suggested that a witness was
gay and therefore his testimony could not be trusted.”75
It is difficult to read these stories without empathizing with the many
victims of the injustices that the authors describe. The book’s narratives put
a human face on problems that many readers may know only in the abstract.
At the same time, the sheer number of stories, many of them familiar,
undercuts the authors’ goals. A more in-depth telling of fewer cases may
have more effectively inspired the advocacy that the authors support.

67

MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 58–59.
Id. at 77.
69
See Robert L. Jacobson, Note, “Megan’s Laws” Reinforcing Old Patterns of Anti-Gay
Police Harassment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2431 (1999) (describing how the wide adoption of sex
offender registry statutes in the 1990s ensnared a new generation of gay men targeted for
minor “sex offenses” such as solicitation, for which straights were rarely arrested).
70
See Marc Mauer, Justice for All? Challenging Racial Disparities in the Criminal
Justice System, HUM. RTS., Fall 2010, at 14.
71
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 59.
72
See Michael H. Meidinger, Peeking Under the Covers: Taking a Closer Look at
Prosecutorial Decision-Making Involving Queer Youth and Statutory Rape, 32 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2012).
73
See Todd Brower, Multistable Figures: Sexual Orientation Visibility and Its Effects on
the Experiences of Sexual Minorities in the Courts, 27 PACE L. REV. 141 (2007) (describing
studies of gays’ experiences in the courts of New Jersey, California, and the United
Kingdom); Todd Brower, Obstacle Courts: Results of Two Studies on Sexual Orientation
Fairness in California Courts, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 39 (2002).
74
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 74–75; cf. Sarah Valentine, When Your Attorney Is
Your Enemy: Preliminary Thoughts on Ensuring Effective Representation for Queer Youth,
19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 773 (2010).
75
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 75.
68
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IV. DEFECTS IN CURRENT REFORM EFFORTS
One of Queer (In)Justice’s most important achievements is its
illumination of the ways in which recent criminal justice reform efforts
have fallen short. In some instances, though, the analysis fails to recognize
important issues or to delve into certain issues in an in-depth way.
For example, the penultimate chapter, “False Promises,” deals with
violence against LGBTQ people. This chapter covers both hate crimes
against gay people and the police response to violence within same-sex
intimate relationships—a combination that is at times dissonant. The
authors’ decision to merge these two topics probably reflects a shift in the
focus of anti-violence advocacy groups from bias crimes to domestic
violence.76 Each of these topics, however, is complex and important and
therefore probably merits its own chapter, if not its own book.
A notable oversight here is the police and judicial [non]response to
same-sex rape. Law professor I. Bennett Capers provides an excellent
analysis of this subject in the article “Real Rape Too” in the California Law
Review.77 Lara Stemple also has written about male rape survivors, using
an international human rights framework.78
True to their theme of taming mass incarceration, the authors of Queer
(In)Justice advocate solutions to the problem of homophobic violence and
domestic violence that do not rely so heavily on criminal punishment,
specifically prison. For example, they reject additional hate crime penalties
as a solution.79 This position brings to the surface questions that are among
the most interesting in the book: How can LGBTQ movements get law
enforcement to take violence against gays seriously when the criminal legal
system has historically criminalized, abused, and stigmatized queer folk? Is
appealing to criminal penalties an appropriate response, when gay sex has
76

Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to “Straighten Out” Criminal Law:
What Might Happen When Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law’s Conventional
Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 81, 89–90 (2003)
(“[Some] anti-violence programs . . . originally founded to focus on issues of violence
against LGBT individuals and communities, such as hate crimes and police brutality, . . .
have since expanded to address the issue of violence within LGBT communities, including
domestic violence.”).
77
Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2011). In a significant
development, the FBI recently announced that it is expanding its definition of rape to include
same-sex rape. See Charlie Savage, U.S. to Expand Its Definition of Rape in Statistics, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, at A11; see also Roni Caryn Rabin, Men Struggle for Rape Awareness,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012, at D1.
78
Lara Stemple, Male Rape and Human Rights, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 605 (2009) (discussing
the problem of male rape and how current female-focused approaches to combating sexual
violence reinforce gender stereotypes).
79
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 123–29.
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been criminally stigmatized for so long in the United States?80 And is it
simply dangerous to vest yet more power in a criminal legal system that
seems to incarcerate poor people and people of color disproportionally
whenever it is entrusted with greater authority?
These debates are familiar to those who have followed the debate
about domestic violence policy in the opposite-sex context. Domestic
violence advocates also have asked whether a movement founded on antisubordination values can or should rely on state power.81 Queer activists
and commentators might want to consider what lessons can be learned from
the feminist domestic violence law reform movements of the 1980s and
1990s.82
The authors also correctly point out that the focus on legislative reform
has severe limits. But on occasion, they fail to make their case as
effectively as they might. For example, the decades-long effort to overturn
sodomy laws culminated in the Supreme Court’s six-to-three decision in
Lawrence holding those laws unconstitutional.83 In its decision, the Court
plainly announced that “the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”84 Scholars have
80

See Spindelman, supra note 3, at 1402–05 (raising many provocative questions, such
as whether the gay rights movement has shied away from airing “dirty laundry” about samesex abuse, and whether it is too complicated for victims of same-sex rape to conceive of
what happened to them as a sexual violation, in part because “[gay] identities were formed in
outlawry”); cf. Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581,
651 (2009) (arguing that “[f]eminists should disengage from rape reforms that strengthen the
penal state,” in part because the criminal justice system does not share the values of the
feminist movement).
81
See LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM (2012) (making the case for a “non-essentialist,” more autonomy-based approach to
domestic violence intervention); Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a
Battered Woman? When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 96–97 (2008);
Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1865–68 (1996); Holly Maguigan, Wading into
Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground” Between Acceptance and Rejection of
Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
427, 429–34 (2003); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the
Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1676–85 (2004).
82
See Ryiah Lilith, Reconsidering the Abuse That Dare Not Speak Its Name: A Criticism
of Recent Legal Scholarship Regarding Same-Gender Domestic Violence, 7 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 181, 211–18 (2001) (questioning whether LGBTQ advocates want to adopt the
solution of mandatory arrest laws); Morrison, supra note 76, at 149–56 (2003) (advocating
the development of “[m]ore nuanced approaches” to domestic violence in queer
relationships).
83
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
84
Id. at 577–78 (emphasis added) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16
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debated whether Lawrence truly rejected a morality-based criminalization
scheme,85 but the decision’s language is clear on this score.86
Nevertheless, sodomy laws are still enforced in states around the
country.87 For example, Lawrence included language that some courts have
interpreted to mean that the decision does not apply to minors.88 These
courts have therefore upheld sodomy prosecutions where a party was under
the age of eighteen. In the most extreme case, one state supreme court
upheld the state’s law criminalizing oral and anal sex among teenagers on
the grounds that the statute properly promotes “the goal of promoting
proper notions of morality among our State’s youth.”89 Heteronormative
views of “morality” thus continue to govern the enforcement of criminal
laws around the country, even after Lawrence held that the morality of the
majority should not form the basis for a criminal law.90
Finally, the authors of Queer (In)Justice point out a dilemma for the
reform agenda. On the one hand, activists seek a broader law enforcement
role in protecting LGBTQ people against gay bashing, bullying, and
domestic violence. The authors present compelling examples of the
limitations on effective law enforcement in these areas. For example, they
write of Los Angeles Police Department officers who, responding to the

BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 41 (2011) (describing lower courts’ resistance to the underlying
philosophy of the Lawrence decision); see also Justin Reinheimer, Comment, What
Lawrence Should Have Said: Reconstructing an Equality Approach, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 505,
505 (2008) (concluding that Lawrence “has had remarkably little impact on” gay rights
litigation).
85
Compare, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking:
Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence
was the culmination of the Court’s movement towards rejecting morality-based rationales for
criminal laws), with Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer,
Lawrence, and the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312,
1313 (2004) (concluding that Lawrence does not hold that the Constitution prohibits criminal
laws rooted in the morality of the majority).
86
See Strader, supra note 84 (analyzing the Lawrence decision and concluding that it
unquestionably rejects morals-based criminal laws).
87
See Huffman, supra note 12.
88
539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent
might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.”); see
Strader, supra note 84, at 59–60 (arguing that Lawrence does not hold that the decision is
inapplicable to minors).
89
In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 925 (N.C. 2007). Similar discriminatory statutes
continue to be enforced in a number of states. See Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and
Legislative Bullies: The Cruel and Invidious Discrimination Behind Heterosexist Statutory
Rape Laws, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195 (2008) (describing how “Romeo and Juliet”
exceptions to statutory rape laws exclude LGBTQ teens).
90
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582; see Strader, supra note 84.
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assault of a Latina transgender woman, reportedly asked paramedics to
examine her genitals; 911 dispatchers in Minnesota who were said to have
“mocked” LGBT callers seeking help; and North Carolina police who failed
to respond to violence against a lesbian couple that included threats against
their child and the killing of the family dog.91
On the other hand, the authors accurately describe the horrors
attendant to the over-incarceration crisis in this country and, in particular, to
the burdens faced by LGBTQ people and people of color in our prisons.92
The authors note that the number of prisoners has skyrocketed and that
more than 60% of all prisoners and more than two-thirds of those serving
life sentences are people of color.93 Sending more people to jail in the
effort to protect LGBTQ people feeds an incarceration system that is
bloated, dysfunctional, and discriminatory. As the authors note: “Queer
engagement with law enforcement cannot be accurately described, much
less analyzed, as a stand-alone, generic ‘gay’ experience because race,
class, and gender are crucial factors in determining how and which queers
will bear the brunt of violence at the hands of the criminal justice system.” 94
In addition, given their treatment in the courts, LGBTQ victims might
rightly hesitate to turn to the criminal justice system for protection. The
authors note the difficulty in “placing primary responsibility for preventing
violence in the hands of a criminal legal system that is itself responsible for
much of the LGBT violence.”95 Instead, the authors of Queer (In)Justice
turn to suggestions for reform that include alternatives to an expanded role
for law enforcement.
V. THE ROAD TO EFFECTIVE REFORMS
Queer (In)Justice faults mainstream gay rights movements with
seeking to separate themselves from queer people perceived as criminals.96
The authors suggest that a “truly progressive queer movement” must
include “multi-issue, nationally-linked, community-based organizing,”97
and that queer activists must stand against the death penalty and in
solidarity with prisoners.98 The authors do not provide a roadmap for
attaining specific reforms. Instead, they offer a queer agenda that is nothing
less than a complete social reconstruction: “diverting resources from war,
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

MOGUL ET AL., supra note 3, at 130–31.
Id. at xi–xii.
Id. at xii.
Id. at xviii.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 155, 158.
Id. at 151–55.
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prison construction, the revolving door criminal legal system, and
increasingly militarized police forces, toward education, drug treatment,
employment programs, community centers, and other initiatives that will
strengthen communities and produce safety for all.”99 Although perhaps
admirable, attaining these goals is a tall order, to say the least.
We share the authors’ goal of reducing the nation’s reliance on our
massive criminal legal system, even while extending evenhanded justice to
previously overlooked categories of crime victims. We are also aware that
the best-intentioned criminal law reforms can backfire when grafted onto a
criminal legal system that all too often targets poor communities of color.100
Our aim in this review is somewhat less ambitious. We seek
principally to highlight potential areas for additional research suggested by
Queer (In)Justice. In particular, we identify potential openings in the law
review literature. These issues are suitable for further exploration by more
traditional legal scholars, by scholars using interdisciplinary approaches,
and by social scientists. The issues raised by the authors of Queer
(In)Justice suggest many such topics of inquiry, and we identify additional
topics as well.
For example, how are family ties addressed in sentencing LGBTQ
defendants? Some theorists have suggested that it is problematic to give
sentencing “discounts” for family ties when some families are not
recognized by the state.101 There is empirical work that could be done to
get a handle on how queer families are described in the criminal courts.102
Research might examine how presentence investigations describe queer
defendants’ relationships and families. Similarly, it might examine how
queer defendants describe their lives at allocution, when the defendant has
an opportunity to make a statement before the sentence is imposed. The
same questions might be examined in the context of judges’ statements at
sentencing. It would be interesting to know how these parts of the process
are changing, if at all. We suspect such changes could be occurring
regionally in response to the evolving views of the “family,” but research is
needed to confirm this conclusion.
A related project would be to examine how “family” is defined in

99

Id. at 157.
See Mauer, supra note 70.
101
See, e.g., Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the
Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1184 (2007) (“[I]n making any benefits
available solely on the basis of family ties, the state necessarily is making express normative
judgments regarding who counts as family and who does not.”).
102
Admittedly, privacy protections for some court documents, such as presentence
investigation reports, may create challenges to this type of research.
100
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correctional regulations for purposes such as visitation.103 A few months
before same-sex marriage passed in New York, the state Department of
Corrections proposed a regulation including same-sex spouses in civil
unions and marriages in a furlough program.104 California already permits
family visitation for registered domestic partners.105 Other corrections
systems define marriage and family more restrictively.106 In Overton v.
Bazzetta, the Supreme Court approved Michigan regulations that defined
family, in that case familial relationships to children, in more traditional
terms.107 There is a need for a comprehensive survey of all family-related
corrections regulations, updated periodically,108 to ascertain if other states
are following New York’s example.
Another possible area of research relates to voir dire questions
designed to root out homophobia or other juror biases. Cynthia Lee has
suggested that voir dire is an important tool both for identifying bias and for
juror education.109 A recent empirical study suggests a need for further
research on juror attitudes towards queer defendants, witnesses, and
complainants.110 It would be useful to hear more from both researchers and
leading attorneys regarding whether any best practices have been identified.
Yet another area for further inquiry, both descriptive and prescriptive,
is police response to violence within the context of LGBTQ relationships.
A number of advocacy groups work in this area, such as the National
103

Cf. Zachary Wolfe, Gay & Lesbian Prisoners: Recent Developments and a Call For
More Research, 10 PRISON LEGAL NEWS 1 (2008) (calling for more research relating to gay
prisoners in three areas: visitation, access to LGBT publications, and use of protective
custody).
104
33 N.Y. Reg. 1–2 (Apr. 20, 2011) (proposing amendments to N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 7, §§ 1900.3(a)(1), 1901.1(a), 1901.1(c)(2)(i)(a) (1993)). Glenn Blain, Paint the
Clinks Pink. Conjugal Visits Allowed for Gay Inmates and Partners, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr.
23, 2011, at 4.
105
Kacy Elizabeth Wiggum, Defining Family in American Prisons, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 357 (2009) (surveying how same-sex partners are treated under family visitation
(conjugal visit) programs).
106
Id. at 374–75 (discussing the example of Mississippi); see also Giovanna Shay, Ad
Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 357–58 (2009) (describing how corrections
regulations can define prisoners’ families).
107
539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003).
108
See Wiggum, supra note 105, at 368–81 (describing restrictions on extended family
visiting programs for unmarried same-sex couples in New Mexico, New York, and
Washington state).
109
Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 559–64 (2008).
110
Shane W. Kraus & Laurie L. Ragatz, Gender, Jury Instructions and Homophobia:
What Influence Do These Factors Have on Legal Decision Making in a Homicide Case
Where the Defendant Utilized the Homosexual Panic Defense?, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 237
(2011) (calling for additional research on juror attitudes towards homosexuality and
suggesting possible voir dire questions).
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Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs.111 Beginning in the 1990s, scholars
have debated the prevalence of abuse in gay and lesbian relationships,112
suggested reforms to domestic violence statutes to protect same-sex
partners,113 and pointed out unresponsiveness (or worse) from the battered
women’s movement, the gay community, law enforcement, and the
courts.114 It would be interesting to hear more about what jurisdictions have
implemented training or other reforms, and how they have fared. It also
will be interesting to see how the response to LGBTQ domestic violence
changes in jurisdictions in which same-sex couples attain more formal
levels of relationship recognition.115
Although the work of the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission under PREA has made clear that LGBTQ prisoners are at
heightened risk of custodial sexual abuse, there are many empirical and
theoretical issues of interest regarding the experiences of gay and trans folk
who are incarcerated.116 For example, the Commission noted that there is
limited research on factors indicating that a prisoner is at a heightened risk
for sexual abuse while incarcerated.117 In addition, some commentators
111

See ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT, http://www.avp.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
Compare Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims
of Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence in Massachusetts, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 273, 277
(1993) (“Most researchers agree that the incidence of battering in lesbian and gay couples is
about the same as it is for heterosexual couples . . . .”), with Lilith, supra note 82, at 184
(“[M]ost studies of same-gender domestic violence examine the dynamics of abuse rather
than the prevalence, providing no support for assertions of parity.”).
113
See Shannon Little, Challenging Changing Legal Definitions of Family in Same-Sex
Domestic Violence, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S. L.J. 259 (2008); Nancy E. Murphy, Queer
Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV.
335 (1995) (suggesting a model gender-neutral domestic violence statute that would include
same-sex couples).
114
Lundy, supra note 112, at 285–92.
115
Cf. Morrison, supra note 76, at 95, 134 (describing how domestic violence laws can
be phrased in gendered terms that exclude same-sex victims, and writing in 2003 that, “[t]o
date . . . the inclusion of same-sex couples . . . in domestic violence law has occurred only
through the back door . . . . [I]n practice, prosecutors and judges can exclude same-sex
couples . . . through statutory interpretation . . . .”); Sharon Stapel, Falling to Pieces: New
York State Civil Legal Remedies Available to Lesbian Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
Survivors of Domestic Violence, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 247, 249 (2007) (describing gaps in
coverage created by New York domestic relations law prior to the recent passage of marriage
equality, and arguing that “domestic violence in the LGBT communities is not adequately
addressed by current laws”).
116
NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT 7–8 (2009).
117
Id. at 7 (“Research to date has focused on vulnerability to abuse by other prisoners,
rather than by staff, and on the risks for men and boys rather than for women and girls.”); see
also M. Dyan McGuire, The Empirical and Legal Realities Surrounding Staff Perpetrated
Sexual Abuse of Inmates, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 428, 435, 441 (2010) (arguing that although
“almost all of the protective efforts to date have been predicated on the assumption that only
112
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have criticized PREA itself,118 called for its amendment,119 or emphasized
next steps to implementation.120 These critiques should be further debated.
Issues regarding cross-gender supervision also are implicated. Some
have asked whether proposed limitations on cross-gender supervision
(currently debated as the Department of Justice prepares regulations under
PREA)121 are heteronormative.122 Others counter that such limits simply
reflect realities about male power over women in custody.123 There is room
for more research about the realities of same-sex custodial sexual abuse
(guard-on-prisoner)124 and about how policies regarding prisoner privacy
should be crafted.
Finally, while male-to-female transgender prisoners have been the

opposite sex guards are a threat,” it is reasonable to conclude that same-sex assaults of
prisoners by guards also occur “on an on-going basis”).
118
See Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 175 (2006)
(describing PREA as “mostly hortatory”); see also Spade, supra note 19 at 91 & n.31
(arguing that “[w]hile passed in the name of preventing sexual assault, the NPREA has been
used to further enforce and increase penalties against prisoners for consensual sexual
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subject of high-profile cases, such as Farmer v. Brennan,125 and have been
examined in scholarship126 and in film,127 there is still more to learn.128 And
we know less about the experiences of female-to-male transgender
prisoners.129 Queer (In)Justice briefly mentions issues raised by the
presence of transgender men in prisons designated for women.130 Like
many areas touched on in the book, there is much room here for further
study.
In all of these areas, more work needs to be done on the ground.
Quantitative research into, for example, the targeting of gay men for lewd
conduct, of trans people for prostitution, and of LGBTQ people of color for
everything is as needed as research into the long-studied phenomenon of
racial profiling.131 Discrimination against LGBTQ people in jury selection
is another issue that merits attention.132
It may be time to create a data clearinghouse of information about
criminal cases involving LGBTQ issues.133 Such a clearinghouse could
include relevant court filings and judicial opinions, as well as academic
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studies on these topics and recommendations of best practices.
Qualitative research would also be extremely helpful. What are the
articulated reasons for such practices? Why do the police arrest whom they
arrest for vague and expansive “vice” crimes that are so open to
discriminatory enforcement? Why do prosecutors choose to pursue some
queer defendants while not pursuing straight defendants in similar
circumstances? How can we educate prosecutors and judges in best
practices to ensure fair trials and counter private homophobia? How can we
best protect prisoners with non-heterosexual orientations from abuse while
incarcerated? These are conversations that we need to engage if we are
ever to get at the root of the problems outlined in Queer (In)Justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
Queer (In)Justice is a fascinating read and a useful contribution to our
understanding of the role of LGBTQ people in the criminal justice system.
Although somewhat anecdotal, it sketches a narrative about queer people in
the criminal legal system that has not yet been given full expression. In his
groundbreaking 1999 work Gaylaw, William Eskridge acknowledged
white, middle-class command of the gay rights movement up to that point,
and wondered where the movement would go when it was guided by the
voices of people of color and working-class gays.134 Queer (In)Justice is
one response to this question. Given the far reach of mass incarceration, it
is not surprising that some of the stories of less-privileged queer folk play
out in the criminal legal system. Our hope is that scholars will fill the
interstices outlined by Queer (In)Justice and point the way to further
progress.
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